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Abstract. A general hill-climbing attack to biometric systems based on
a modication of the downhill simplex algorithm is presented. The scores
provided by the matcher are used in this approach to adapt iteratively
an initial estimate of the attacked template to the specicities of the
client being attacked. The proposed attack is evaluated on a competitive
feature-based signature verication system over both the MCYT and
the BiosecurID databases (comprising 330 and 400 users, respectively).
The results show a very high eciency of the hill-climbing algorithm,
which successfully bypassed the system for over 90% of the attacks with
a remarkably low number of scores needed.
1 Introduction
Biometric security systems are nowadays being introduced in many applications,
such as access control, sensitive data protection, on-line tracking systems, etc.,
due to their advantages over traditional security approaches [1]. Nevertheless,
they are also susceptible to external attacks that can decrease their security level.
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to analyse the vulnerabilities of biomet-
ric systems so that their weaknesses can be found and useful countermeasures
against foreseeable attacks can be developed.
There are two main types of attacks that may put at risk the security oered
by a biometric system: (i) direct attacks, carried out against the sensor using
synthetic traits, such as printed iris images or gummy ngers [2]; and (ii) indirect
attacks, carried out against some of the inner modules of the system [3, 4], and
thus requiring for the attacker to have some knowledge about the system (e.g.,
storage format or matcher used). A more detailed analysis of the vulnerable
points of biometric systems is made by Ratha et al. in [5]. In this work 8 possible
points of attack are identied, the rst corresponding to direct ones and the
remaining seven to indirect attacks.
Several works have already studied the robustness of biometric systems against
direct attacks, specially ngerprint- and iris-based, including [2, 3, 6]. In the case
of indirect attacks, most of the studies use some kind of variant of the hill-
climbing algorithm [4]. Some examples include an indirect attack to a face-based
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system in [7], and to a PC and Match-on-Card minutiae-based ngerprint ver-
ication systems in [8] and [9], respectively. These attacks iteratively change
a synthetic template, according to the scores given by the matcher, until the
similarity score exceeds a xed decision threshold. This way, the access to the
system is granted. These hill-climbing approaches, except for the one proposed
in [10], are all highly dependent of the technology used, only being usable for
very specic types of matchers.
In the present paper, a hill-climbing algorithm based on an adaptation of the
downhill simplex algorithm [11], is presented. The main contribution of the work
lies in the fact that this general approach can be applied to any system working
with xed length feature vectors, regardless of the biometric trait being used.
The proposed method uses the scores provided by the matcher to adapt an initial
simplex, computed from a development set of users, to the local specicities of the
client being attacked. The performance of the attack is evaluated on a feature-
based signature verication system using the MCYT [12] and the BiosecurID
[13] databases (comprising 330 and 400 users, respectively). In the experiments,
the attack showed a remarkable performance, similar with both databases, being
able to bypass over 90% of the accounts attacked for the best conguration of
the algorithm found.
The paper is structured as follows. The general hill-climbing algorithm is
described in Sect. 2, while the case study in signature verication is reported
in Sect. 3. In Sect. 3.1 we present the attacked system, and the database and
experimental protocol followed are described in Sect 3.2. The results are detailed
in Sect. 3.3. Conclusions are nally drawn in Sect. 4.
2 Hill-Climbing based on the Uphill Simplex Algorithm
Consider the problem of nding a K-dimensional vector y which, compared to
an unknown template C (in our case related to a specic client), produces a
similarity score bigger than a certain threshold , according to some matching
function J , i.e.: J(C;y) > . The template can be another K-dimensional vector
or a generative model of K-dimensional vectors.
Let us consider a simplex, that is, a polygon dened by K + 1 points in
the K-dimensional space, obtained randomly from a statistical model G (a K-
variate Gaussian with mean G and diagonal covariance matrix G, with 
2
G =
diagG, related to a background set of users, overlapping to some extent with
C), and let us assume that we have access to the evaluation of the matching
function J(C;y) for several trials of y. Then, the problem stated above can
be solved by adapting the downhill simplex algorithm rst presented in [11] to
maximize instead of minimize the function J . We iteratively form new simplices
by reecting one point, yl, in the hyperplane of the remaining points, until we
are close enough to the maximum of the function. The point to be reected will
always be the one with the lowest value given by the matching function, since
it is in principle the one furthest from our objective. Thus, the dierent steps
followed by the attacking hill climbing algorithm are:
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1. Compute the statistical model G(G;G) from a development pool of users.
2. Take K + 1 samples (yi) dening the initial simplex from the statistical
model G(G;G) and compute the similarity scores J(C;yi) = si, with
i = 1; : : : ;K + 1.
3. Compute the centroid y of the simplex as the average of yi:
y =
1
K + 1
X
i
yi
4. Reect the point yl according to the next steps, adapted from the downhill
simplex algorithm [11]. In the following, the indices l and h are dened as:
h = argmax
i
(si)
l = argmin
i
(si)
4.a. Reection: Given a constant  > 0, the reection coecient, we com-
pute:
a = (1 + )y   yl:
Thus, a is on the line between yl and y being  the ratio between the
distances [ay] and [yly]. If sl < sa < sh we replace yl by a. Otherwise,
we go on to step 4b.
4.b. Expansion or contraction.
4.b.1 Expansion: If sa > sh (i.e., we have a new maximum) we expand a
to b as follows:
b = a+ (1  )y;
where  > 1 is another constant called expansion coecient, which
represents the ratio between the distances [by] and [ay]. If sb > sh,
we replace yl by b. Otherwise, we have a failed expansion and replace
yl by a.
4.b.2 Contraction: If we have reached this step, then sa  sl (i.e. re-
placing yl by a would leave sa as the new minimum). Afterwards we
compute
b = yl + (1  )y;
where 0 <  < 1 is the contraction coecient, dened as the ratio
between the distances [by] and [yly]. If sb > max(sl; sa), then we
replace yl by b; otherwise, the contracted point is worse than yl, and
for such a failed contraction we replace all the yi's by (yi + yh)=2.
5. With the new yl value, update the simplex and return to step 3.
The hill climbing algorithm stops when sh   or when the maximum number
of iterations M is reached.
The iterative optimization algorithm used here as core of the proposed hill-
climbing attack is an adaptation of the downhill simplex rst presented in [11],
which has been modied in order to maximize a given function and where several
redundant conditions have been discarded. From now on, this modied version
of the original algorithm will be referred to as uphill simplex.
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3 Case study: Attacking a Feature-Based On-Line
Signature Verication System
3.1 Signature Verication System
The proposed hill-climbing method attack based on the uphill simplex algorithm
is used to attack the feature-based on-line signature verication system consid-
ered in [10] so that the results on the performance of the two hill-climbing attacks
(i.e., that proposed in [10], and the one presented here) may be compared. The
signatures are parametrized using the set of features described in [14]. In that
work, a set of 100 global features was proposed, and the individual features
were ranked according to their individual discriminant power. A good operating
point for the systems tested was found when using the rst 40 parameters. In
the present contribution we use this 40-feature representation of the signatures,
normalizing each of them to the range [0,1] using the tanh-estimators described
in [15]:
p
0
k =
1
2

tanh

0:01

pk   pk
pk

+ 1

; (1)
where pk is the kth parameter, p
0
k denotes the normalized parameter, and pk and
pk are respectively the estimated mean and standard deviation of the parameter
under consideration.
The similarity scores are computed using the Mahalanobis distance between
the input vector and a statistical model C of the attacked client, using a number
of training signatures (4 or 5 in our experiments). Thus,
J(C;y) = 1
(y   C)T (C) 1 (y   C)
1=2 ; (2)
where C and C are respectively the mean vector and covariance matrix ob-
tained from the training signatures (i.e., the statistical model of the client) and
y is the 40-feature vector used to attack the system.
3.2 Databases and Experimental Protocol
In order to avoid biased results, two dierent databases were used in the exper-
iments: the MCYT database [12] and the BiosecurID database [13].
The rst of them, MCYT, is used as development set in order to compute
the best parameter values of the attack and to obtain a rst estimation of its
performance, which may be compared to that of the hill climbing attack proposed
in [10]. The ndings obtained on the MCYT database are then used to analyse
the algorithm performance on a totally dierent database (BiosecurID), in order
to get to a realistic overall evaluation of the attacking capabilities and eciency
of the proposed hill climbing technique. Next, the experimental protocol followed
with each of the databases is presented.
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Fig. 1. FA and FR curves the MCYT (left) and BiosecurID (right) databases.
MCYT experimental protocol. The initial evaluation experiments are
carried out on the MCYT signature database [12], comprising 330 users. The
database was acquired in 4 dierent sites with 5 time-spaced capture sets. Every
client was asked to sign 5 times in each set, thus capturing 25 genuine signatures
per user.
The experimental protocol is the same followed in [10], so that the nal results
are fully comparable. Thus, the database is divided into a training set (used to
estimate the distribution G from which the initial simplex is taken) and a test set
(containing the user's accounts being attacked), which are afterwards swapped
(two-fold cross-validation). The training set initially comprises one signature
from the genuine ones of the odd users in the database, and the test set the
genuine samples of the even users. This way, the donors captured in the 4 sites
are homogeneously distributed over the two sets.
For each user, ve dierent genuine models are computed using one training
signature from each acquisition set, so that the temporal variability of the signing
process is taken into account. With this approach, a total 330  5 = 1; 650
accounts are attacked (825 in each of the two-fold cross-validation process).
In order to set the threshold , where we consider that the attack has been
successful, the False Acceptance (FA) and False Rejection (FR) curves of the
system are computed. Each of the 5 estimated models of every user is matched
with the remaining 20 genuine signatures (520330 = 33; 000 genuine scores),
while the impostor scores are generated comparing the 5 statistical models with
one signature of the remaining donors, making a total of 5330329 = 542; 850
random impostor scores. The FA and FR curves are depicted in Fig. 1 (left),
together with three dierent realistic operating points used in the attack exper-
iments (FA = 0.05%, FA = 0.01%, and FA = 0.0025%).
BiosecurID Experimental Protocol. In order to check whether the al-
gorithm is equally eective with dierent databases, we established an analo-
gous experimental protocol to the one dened for MCYT using the BiosecurID
database [13]. This database comprises 400 users and was acquired in 4 dierent
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sessions in a 6 month time-span. Every client was asked to sign 4 times in each
set, leading to 16 genuine signatures per user.
Analogously to the MCYT database, 4 dierent models are computed for each
client using one signature from each acquisition set (i.e., 4 dierent signatures)
so that the temporal variability is taken into account.
As before, the threshold  is xed after computing the FA and FR curves.
The set of genuine and impostor scores are generated respectively matching each
of the 4 estimated models of every user against the remaining 12 genuine samples
of each subject (412400 = 19; 200 genuine scores), and against one signature
of the other donors (leading to 4  399  400 = 638; 400 impostor scores). The
FA and FR curves forgeries are depicted in Fig. 1 (right), together with three
dierent realistic operating points used in the attack experiments (FA = 0.05%,
FA = 0.01%, and FA = 0.0025%).
In order to assure that the hill-climbing performance results obtained on the
BiosecurID database are in no way data-adapted, the initial G distribution in
this experimental protocol is estimated on the MCYT database (i.e., part of the
users in MCYT are used as training set), while BiosecurID is used only as test
set.
3.3 Results
The goal of the experiments is to analyse in an objective and replicable manner
the attacking skills of the proposed hill-climbing algorithm. With this objective,
the performance of the attack will be evaluated in terms of the success rate and
eciency, dened as [16]:
{ Success Rate (SR): it is the expected probability that the attack breaks
a given account. It is computed as the ratio between the number of broken
accounts (AB) and the total number of accounts attacked (AT ):
SR =
AB
AT
This parameter indicates how dangerous the attack is: the higher the SR,
the bigger the threat.
{ Eciency (Eff): it indicates the average number of matchings needed by
the attack to break an account. It is dened as
Eff =
ABX
i=1
ni
AB
;
where ni is the number of matchings computed to bypass each of the broken
accounts. This parameter gives an estimation of how easy it is for the attack
to break into the system in terms of speed: the lower the Eff , the faster the
attack.
A direct comparison between the attack performance results obtained on the
MCYT database and those presented in [10] will also be given in this section.
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Analysis of ,  and . The goal of the initial experiments carried out on
the MCYT database is to study the eect of varying the three parameters of the
algorithm (,  and ) on the performance of the attack. As described in Sect. 2,
these parameters aect how the new point of the simplex is computed at each
iteration and denote:  the reection coecient,  the expansion coecient, and
 the contraction coecient.
The main objective of this experiment is not to search for the optimal values
of [; ; ], but rather to understand their eect on the attack behaviour and to
nd a general suboptimal set of values for which the algorithm may present a
good performance under dierent attacking scenarios. To do so, we will perform
three successive steps xing in each of them two of the parameters and sweeping
the other in a given range. According to the original downhill simplex algorithm
[11], the best values for the parameters are  = 1,  = 2 and  = 0:5. Thus, we
run the experiments in ranges centred on those values, taking always into account
the constraints explained in Sect. 2, namely:  > 0,  > 1 and 0 <  < 1. The
operating point chosen was FA = 0:05% and FR = 11:80%, for a maximum
number of iterations M = 5; 000.
{ Step 1: . First we vary  with  = 2 and  = 0:5. As can be seen in
Fig. 2,a good performance point is reached for  = 1:1.
{ Step 2: . Then, with  = 1:1 and  = 0:5 xed, we sweep  from 1 to 2.5.
This second plot reaches a maximum at 1.1.
{ Step 3: . Finally, with those two xed values ( = 1:1 and  = 1:1), we
nd a maximum for  at 0.8.
This will be the set of parameter values that will be used in the rest of the
experiments, [; ; ] = [1:1; 1:1; 0:8].
Analysis of dierent operating points. In this experiment, the suboptimal
set of parameter values found in the previous section [; ; ] = [1:1; 1:1; 0:8] is
used here to analyse the performance of the attack for dierent operating points
of the automatic signature verication system, namely: FA = [0:05%; 0:01%; 0:0025%],
which correspond to those considered by Galbally et al. [10]. Therefore, results
of both works (shown in Table 1) may be directly compared. The SR dierence
between both attacks is less than 8%, while the eciency improved about 75%
with our proposed method. This way, the hill-climbing based on the uphill sim-
plex proves to be highly competitive, breaking the accounts remarkably faster
than the Bayesian hill-climbing, at the cost of a small loss of accuracy.
Analysis of the initial G distribution. In this last development experiment,
also carried out on the MCYT database, the number of users employed for the
estimation of the initial distribution G is varied from 5 to 165 in order to study
its impact on the attack performance. The SR improvement was lower than 3% in
terms of SR and Eff for all operating points, as can be observed in Fig. 3. Thus,
the attack proves to be highly competitive with as few as 5 dierent training
signatures compared to over 150 needed by the algorithm proposed in [10].
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 2. (a) Success rates for  2 [0:5; 1:4];  = 2;  = 0:5. Maximum at  = 1:1. (b)
Success rates for  2 [1; 2:4];  = 1:1;  = 0:5. Maximum at  = 1:1. (c) Success rates
for  2 [0:1; 1];  = 1:1;  = 1:1. Maximum at  = 0:8.
Analysis of the performance on the BiosecurID database. Finally, the
knowledge acquired in the previous experiments was applied to study the depen-
dency of the attack performance on the data being used. Thus, the parameter
values xed in the MCYT database (i.e., [; ; ] = [1:1; 1:1; 0:8]) are deployed
to attack the accounts of the subjects comprised in the BiosecurID database. As
mentioned in Sect. 3.2, the initial distribution G is computed using one signature
from each of the initial 5 users in MCYT. This way, the training set (MCYT) and
test set (BiosecurID) are totally independent, leading to fully unbiased results.
As shown in Table 2, the performance of the attack is very similar, both
in terms of the eciency and the success rates for both datasets. Even though
Eff is a little higher for all the three dierent operating points, it must be
taken into account that in the case of MCYT, the parameters of the algorithm
were specically adjusted for the dataset, while they remained the same for
this second database. On the other hand, the SR is about 2% higher in the
case of BiosecurID, proving that the algorithm has a high adaptation capability,
performing well under dierent operating conditions.
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Fig. 3. Success rates for the three operating points tested (FA = 0.05%, FA = 0.01%,
FA = 0.0025%), for an increasing number of subjects used to compute the distribution
G from which the initial simplex is taken.
FA
Uphill simplex Gal. et al. [10]
SR Eff SR Eff
0.05% 91.76% 1,556 98.12% 5,712
0.01% 89.58% 1,678 96.60% 6,076
0.0025% 87.82% 1,805 94.90% 6,475
Table 1. Eciency and SR (in %) for each operating point, compared to the perfor-
mance results given in Galbally et al. [10].
Graphical example. An execution of the attack at the FA = 0.05% operat-
ing point and using the best algorithm conguration for the database MCYT is
shown in Fig. 4. The signature was successfully attacked in less than 500 itera-
tions. At the top of the gure, we can see a signature of the client being attacked
as well as the successive best similarity scores in each iteration until the thresh-
old  is reached. At the bottom, the evolution of the simplices corresponding
to the scores marked with a vertical line are shown for two pairs of parameters
(1 and 2 on the left, 3 and 4 on the right). A darker colour denotes a previous
FA
BiosecurID MCYT
SR Eff SR Eff
0.05% 92.69% 2,051 91.32% 1,178
0.01% 87.94% 2,440 88.43% 1,353
0.0025% 83.44% 2,611 86.77% 1,661
Table 2. Success rate (in %) and Eciency for each operating point tested, using 5
subjects from MCYT for the training of the initial simplex, for both the MCYT and
the BiosecurID databases.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the algorithm in a successful attack. On the top we show one
signature of the client attacked (left) and the scores reached for every iteration of the
hill-climbing algorithm (right). On the bottom appear the simplices corresponding to
the scores marked with a vertical line for parameters one and two (left) and three and
four (right). A darker colour denotes a previous iteration while the cross shows the
target being attacked.
iteration and the cross is the target being attacked. It can be observed that the
simplices quickly approach the target, diminishing their area at the same time.
4 Conclusions
In the present work, a hill-climbing attack based on the uphill simplex algorithm,
an adaptation of downhill simplex, was presented and evaluated on a feature-
based signature verication system using two dierent databases comprising 330
and 400 users, respectively. Several experiments proved its high eciency, reach-
ing success rates over 90% for the best conguration found.
The algorithm performance was also compared to that of the Bayesian hill-
climbing attack [10], resulting in very similar success rates but with a convergence
speed which is around four times faster (it needs a quarter of the number of
matchings to break the same amount of accounts). Furthermore, the proposed
algorithm only requires 5 dierent real signatures to be initialized, in opposition
to the Bayesian-based attack, where over 150 samples were used.
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The experiments have also shown that the performance of the proposed at-
tack is independent of the data being used, as the results obtained in both
databases (MCYT and BiosecurID) were almost identical although the attack
parameters had been specically xed for the MCYT database.
It should nally be emphasized that the proposed attack can be applied to the
evaluation of the vulnerabilities of any biometric system based on xed length
templates of real numbers, regardless of the matcher or biometric trait being
used.
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